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Abstract. The article introduces a cognitive and componential view of religious 
emotions. General emotions are claimed to consist of at least two compounds, 
the cognitive compound and the affective compound. Religious emotions are 
typically general emotions which are characterized by three specific conditions: 
they involve a thought of God or godlike, they are significant for a person feeling 
them and their meaning is derived from religious practices. The article discusses 
the notion of spiritual emotions in Ancient theology and compares the idea of 
it with emotions in music. By referring to the notion of mental language, it is 
argued that some religious emotions are like emotions in music and as such they 
can be interpreted as tones of Logos.
In what follows, I  first sketch out the general view on emotions as 
componential and cognitive mental phenomena. I  then shift the focus 
onto specific properties of religious emotions. At the end of this article 
I  make a  suggestion that what Ancient theologians called spiritual 
emotions can be interpreted as tones of Logos. According to the notion 
of spiritual emotions, there are emotions which cannot be uttered 
in natural language. They are based on new senses and new kinds of 
supernatural cognitive contents. According to the idea of music put 
forward by Peter Kivy in his Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, there 
are emotions which are not only caused by music but which are in music. 
By using Kivy’s idea I shall discuss the relation between emotions, music, 
and Logos.
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I. EMOTIONS AS COGNITIVE AND COMPONENTIAL PHENOMENA
Good morning, on July 7
Though still in bed, my thoughts go out to you, my Immortal Beloved, 
now and then joyfully, then sadly, waiting to learn whether or not fate 
will hear us – I can live only wholly with you or not at all – Yes, I am 
resolved to wander so long away from you until I can fly to your arms and 
say that I am really at home with you, and can send my soul enwrapped 
in you into the land of spirits – Yes, unhappily it must be so – You will be 
the more contained since you know my fidelity to you. No one else can 
ever possess my heart – never – never – Oh God, why must one be parted 
from one whom one so loves. And yet my life in V is now a wretched life – 
Your love makes me at once the happiest and the unhappiest of men – At 
my age I need a steady, quiet life – can that be so in our connection? My 
angel, I have just been told that the mailcoach goes every day – therefore 
I must close at once so that you may receive the letter at once – Be calm, 
only by a clam consideration of our existence can we achieve our purpose 
to live together – Be calm – love me – today – yesterday – what tearful 
longings for you – you – you – my life – my all – farewell. Oh continue to 
love me – never misjudge the most faithful heart of your beloved.
ever thine
ever mine
ever ours1
This is a  letter written by Ludwig van Beethoven to his immortal and 
‘unknown beloved’. The identification of Beethoven’s beloved has long 
been an open issue to some extent. An interesting though controversial 
account concerning this matter has been given by Maynard Solomon in 
his Beethoven biography. According to Solomon, the letter is addressed 
to Antonie Brentano.2 If so, one encounters here a pretty nice historical 
curiosity. The founder of modern psychology, Franz Brentano seems to 
belong to the younger generation of the same family with Beethoven’s 
unknown beloved. In general introductions such as the Stanford 
Encyclopedy of Philosophy, he is meant to be a  nephew of the poet 
Clement Brentano, who was a brother of Franz, Antonie’s husband.3
1 Cited from <http://www.all-about-beethoven.com/immortalbeloved.html> 
[accessed 30/08/2014].
2 Maynard Solomon, Beethoven (New York: Schirmer Trade Books, 2001).
3 For the Brentano family and its relations to Beethoven see also Denis Matthews, 
Beethoven (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).
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As is well known, Franz Brentano’s notion of intentionality is a basic 
concept of both psychology and philosophy of mind. Intentionality 
distinguishes human minds from machines which are just functional. 
According to the notion of intentionality, the human mind is directed 
to inner objects, called intentional objects, as believing, wishing and 
imagining. Intentional objects for their part are mental construals which 
typically involve some correlate in the extramental world.
For instance, when writing a letter to Antonie Brentano, Beethoven’s 
loving mind was directed to its inner object that was the image of Antonie 
Brentano as the object of love. Such an inner object had its correlate, the 
real and living Antonie Brentano. But the question arises which kind of 
correspondence there was between an inner and an outer object of love. 
Was the inner object just a pure copy of the outer object? Well, if you 
prefer, for instance, some kind of Augustinian theory of sense perception, 
you can rely on the fact that forms of entities transfer to mind as such 
as they are. But if you are willing to take the Kantian position, you of 
course argue that there is no pure mind. The mind is doing something 
with perceptions as forming them. For this reason the unknown beloved 
remains unknown even when knowing her name.
The contemporary discussion on emotions in philosophy of mind 
has strongly paid attention to the intentional character of emotions. For 
some theories, for instance those put forward by Robert Solomon and 
Martha Nussbaum, the intentional object of emotions is so crucial to 
them that it is almost sufficient to characterise emotions by referring 
to their intentional aspects. For Solomon and Nussbaum, emotions 
are judgments. For Solomon emotions are existential judgments that 
magically change the world. The world is different from the point of view 
of love and from that of hate, for instance. For Solomon emotions are our 
personal attitudes to the world. For Nussbaum emotions are judgments 
of value.4 Following Nussbaum’s own example: when it was reported 
to her that her mother was dead, it was grief that made such a state of 
matters significant and valuable for her.5
Judgment theories of emotions in modern discussion have historical 
predecessors. The Stoic philosophers thought that emotions are 
judgments of some particular aspect of the world as good or bad. As 
4 Robert Solomon, The Passions (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).
5 Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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such they are all false. The wise Stoic is not tied to particular aspects of 
the world but he or she is rather tied to the world as a whole. In order to 
be a cosmopolitan person, the wise Stoic ought to get rid of emotions. 
Such a view was regarded as inhuman even in Ancient times.6 There is, 
however, a certain wit in the Stoic view. Let us imagine that a world is just 
a huge supermarket. All kind of sellers are all the time suggesting to you 
to buy something. A wise person says ‘no, thank you, I am concentrating 
on world peace, women’s rights, ecological matters and so on, I have got 
bigger things on my mind’. According to my reading, that was exactly 
what the Stoics argued. For them emotions are suggestions which are 
leading the mind to nonsense. When getting rid of such matters, the 
mind is able to face things that are significant for human life. Moreover, 
even Stoics had the idea of passionate life with their notion of a new kind 
of intellectual emotions called eupatheiai.
I  personally believe that even though the judgment theory of 
emotions is an  elucidating one, it is not the whole story of emotions. 
First, there appear to be emotions that do not involve judgments. 
A person may have, for instance, a weak feeling that something positive 
is at hand. He or she does not know what it is and one is not sure whether 
there is reason to believe or not to believe so. One is feeling something, 
however. He or she has a guessing experience rather than judgment. It 
is one aspect of judgments that they involve an assent. Many emotions 
do not involve it. Furthermore, when characterising emotions, there 
are also other aspects of them to take into an account. Such a strategy 
is adopted to theories of emotions called componential theories. The 
early representative of componential theories was that put forward by 
Aristotle. In contemporary discussion, William Lyons, Ronald de Sousa, 
Patricia Greenspan and Peter Goldie have advocated theories which are 
componential and which emphasise the affective character of emotions 
more than the judgment theory.7
6 For the Stoic theory, see Richard Sorabji, ‘Chrysippos – Posidonius – Seneca: A High 
Level Debate on Emotions’, in Juha Sihvola & Troels Endgberg-Pedersen (eds.), The 
Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (The New Synthese Historical Library, 46) (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), pp. 149-169.
7 William Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1987); Patricia Greenspan, Emotions & Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional 
Justification (New York: Routledge, 1988); Peter Goldie, The Emotions: A Philosophical 
Exploration (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
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For Aristotle, emotions involve an evaluation stating that something 
positive or negative is at hand in a relevant way to a person. The former 
gives rise to a pleasant or unpleasant feeling that is associated usually 
with bodily changes. These together cause some suggestion to behave 
in a  certain way.8 In modern discussion for instance William Lyons 
suggests that typical emotions are constituted by several components 
such as perception, belief, evaluation, desire, behavioural suggestion, 
physiological changes and their registrations. For his causal-evaluative 
theory, in order to be deemed as an emotion, a mental phenomenon has 
to involve self-regarding evaluation that causes abnormal physiological 
changes.9
My own view is as follows. I call the generic condition of emotions 
the idea that all emotions involve both a  cognitive component and 
an affective component.10 Love is sometimes regarded as a mood rather 
than an emotion. But let us consider shortly what Ludwig van Beethoven 
felt when loving Antonie Brentano. Components of such a feeling are at 
least: first, the external object of love, Antonie Brentano, secondly, the 
perception of Antoine which gives rise to thirdly, the inner object or 
intentional object of Antonie as interpreted in a  certain way, fourthly, 
the self-regarding evaluation of Antonie which involves some cognitive 
attitude that Antoine is fascinating just for Ludwig. These four aspects 
give rise to the affective components. Beethoven felt bodily changes but 
he also felt some mental changes. It was his soul that was full of love. To be 
aware of such changes, both bodily and mental, is to feel. The term feeling 
is on the one hand synonymous to the term ‘emotion’ as well as it seems 
to me that the German ‘Gefûhl’ is not synonymous with but correlates to 
‘Gemûtsbewegungen’ in a certain use. In ancient discussion it was noted 
that affectus, passio, perturbatio and so on refer to the same.11 The term 
feeling refers on the one hand to the same mental phenomenon with the 
term emotion but it on the other hand refers to one crucial component of 
emotions. Feelings are unanalysable qualia, unpleasant or pleasant states 
of consciousness by virtue of which one is aware of one’s state.
8 For Aristotle’s theory, see Simo Knuuttila & Juha Sihvola, ‘How the Philosophical 
Analysis of Emotions was Introduced’ in Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions 
in Hellenistic Philosophy, pp. 1-19.
9 William Lyons, Emotion, p. 58.
10 Petri Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions (Luther Agricola Gesellschaft, 47) 
(Helsinki: Luther Agricola Society, 2000).
11 Augustine, De civ. Dei IX. 4
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It was claimed above that Beethoven felt love in his soul. One 
could point out that such an argument involves just a kind of medieval 
commitment. There is no soul as well as there is not water but a chemical 
phenomenon. As is well known, there are various views of the soul. 
Moreover, there is not any common view accepted by all. This is one 
problem associated with the theory of emotions. Since there is no clear 
view of what mind is, it is not easy to characterise its movements such as 
emotions. I myself am influenced by the so called Cartesian framework 
even though I  don’t believe that the soul is a  distinct substance of its 
own. But if I have to answer my opinion to John Searle’s Chinese room, 
I would say that a person in the room cannot understand the Chinese 
language.12 Let us suppose that you are in a room with boxes and a book 
containing rules. From the window of the right wall someone is putting 
things into the room and you are arranging them into boxes following 
the rules in a book you have. Then you are outputting these boxes from 
the window of the left wall. People behind that can understand the 
Chinese language and it appears that the book you had was a grammar 
of that language. By the help of the book you had arranged boxes in 
such a manner that produced Chinese sentences. Did you understand 
that language if you produced it correctly? I think that no. Many people 
would say yes, however.
Saying ‘no’ means that you are operating within the Cartesian 
framework. You are finding understanding and corresponding mental 
phenomena as black boxes which cannot be explained precisely by 
material terms. I believe that Spinoza made a nice correction to Descartes’ 
theory. Mind and body refer to the same from a different point of view. 
But I  think that we are not able to explain mental phenomena purely 
by referring to bodily phenomena. Perhaps mental phenomena are 
emergent macro properties raised in our brains. Anyway, it makes sense 
to think like Ludwig Wittgenstein: I feel various emotions but if my skull 
is opened, who knows whether there are brains or not at all.
II. RELIGIOUS EMOTIONS AS SPECIFIC TYPES OF EMOTIONS
Let us proceed to deal with religious emotions. What is the difference if 
the unknown beloved in Beethoven’s letter is not Antonie Brentano but 
12 John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1984).
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God? Is there something different in affective level of an emotion? Does 
a person feel differently if he or she loves God instead of human being? 
Are religious joy, sorrow and hope different from general joy, sorrow, 
and hope?
Let us suppose that typical religious emotions do not involve special 
affective qualities. Typical religious emotions as feelings are not different 
from other feelings. Historically, that kind of view has been advocated 
by authors from Augustine via medieval discussion to William James. 
According to Augustine, believers feel natural joy when love of God 
is present, natural hope when it is hidden, natural sorrow when it 
is disturbed and natural fear when it is in danger.13 Furthermore, in 
medieval discussion it was pointed out that if there are two monks who 
love God, it may be that one is taken to heaven and another put to hell 
depending on whether their love is caused by the Holy Spirit or not. But 
one is not able to evaluate the supernatural causation on the affective 
basis. Loving God caused by a  person’s own wishful thinking is not 
a different feeling from loving God caused by the Holy Spirit.14
However, to my mind it makes sense to label typical religious 
emotions as specific type of emotions. As emotions they fulfil what 
I  called the generic condition of emotions. They involve cognitive 
aspects and affective aspects. As a specific type of emotions they have to 
fulfil three conditions. First, they have to involve some thought, image, 
judgment, or idea of God or godlike implicitly or explicitly. Secondly, 
the cognitive component has to be personally significant for a  person 
feeling the emotion. Thirdly, in order to be deemed a religious emotion, 
the cognitive component and the personal significance have to derive 
their meaning from religious practises. For one can feel emotions 
towards religious objects in such a  manner that his or her emotion 
is not religious. If a  person goes to a  church and admires statues and 
paintings there, he or she may say ‘how beautiful are the gods here’. So, 
there is an emotion towards religious objects. But such an emotion do 
not involve any religious meaning. I do not share here the argument of 
a Swedish atheistic professor of philosophy who played the violin in the 
chapel orchestra. When asked why an atheist is so eager to play church 
music, he answered: even I have my right to religious feelings. A person 
13 Augustine, De civ. Dei, XIV.
14 Artur Mikael Landgraf, Die Gnadenlehre. Band II (Dogmengesichte der 
Frûhscholastik. Ersten Teil) (Regensburg: Verlang Friedrich Pustet, 1953), pp. 61-63.
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may feel emotions towards religious contents without feeling religiously. 
I believe a person has to take such emotions religiously if they are to be 
regarded as religious emotions.15
Taken for granted that religious emotions as felt experiential 
phenomena do not differ from other emotions, it is their cognitive 
content taken after the religious fashion that makes them specifically 
religious. Their cognitive content is associated with the notion of God 
or godlike, something transcendent that one finds holy. The notion of 
God is, however, an inner or intentional object of a religious emotion. 
Usually believers hold that such a  notion refers to its correlate in the 
extramental world. But at least to some extend the extramental or outer 
object of religious emotions, God, remains as an unknown beloved, as 
Deus absconditus.
As such religious emotions are cognitive. But, are they rational? 
Are there good philosophical reasons to feel them? Do they involve 
some epistemological value as it seems to have been argued by English 
speaking contemporary philosophers such as Swinburne, Plantinga, 
Alston and some others? Concerning proofs of God, religious emotions 
may involve some kind of supporting power for argumentation. One 
could say that because such a large amount of people are feeling them, it 
could make sense to take religion and its views seriously. It seems to me, 
however, that religious emotions do not provide any direct and testified 
knowledge. They are rather interiorisations of what is believed either on 
the basis or not on the basis of rational argumentation. Moreover, I find 
pretty speculative both views put forward by Friedrich Schleiermacher 
and Rudolf Otto according to which all people have kind of religious 
sense or feeling. There are people who do not feel religious emotions. 
There are even Christian traditions such as that advocated by Karl Barth 
according to which it is spiritually misleading to feel religiously.
A  person who is an  atheist could say to a  believer that his or her 
religious emotion is of course cognitive thanks to its intentional object. 
According to atheistic point of view there is not, however, any extramental 
real correlate of the inner object of an  emotion. Let us imagine that 
a person is listening to worship on the radio. While listening to it he or 
she begins to feel feelings toward God as profound as those Beethoven 
felt toward his unknown beloved. He or she could point out that it was 
God who raised those emotions in one’s soul. What kind of rational 
15 Petri Järveläinen, A Study on Religious Emotions, pp. 45-70.
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argument could a  person give to an  opponent who argues that those 
feelings came from drinking too much coffee throughout the worship? 
Coffee activated the brain of the worship listener and produced a strong 
mood. Such a mood gave rise to particular emotions. They adopted the 
notion of God as their intentional object.
The problem here concerns the rational justification of religious 
emotions. If one cannot explain their cause, the door is open to any kind 
of counter arguments against them. As an explanation, God is as strong 
as drinking too much coffee.
Such a problem seems to be one basis for the discussion of emotions 
in ancient theological thinking. Above all in Alexandrian theology, 
natural emotions, even natural religious emotions, were not highly 
valued. Influenced by a  Stoic theory of emotions, both Origen and 
Clement of Alexandria thought that natural emotions such as fear belong 
to an early and preparatory stage of Christian life. Advanced Christians 
have reached a  state of apathy which means that they are detached 
from natural emotions. In a state of apathy they are given new kinds of 
experiences, spiritual emotions that are only metaphorically similar to 
natural emotions.16
In ‘On the First Principles’, Origen maintains that there are two kind 
of senses. The first group of senses involves senses that are mortal and 
human. The second group of senses are immortal and intellectual. They 
are divine or spiritual senses (theia aisthesis). The spiritual senses signify 
a new kind of ability to apprehend divine matters. The divinised soul, 
having spiritual senses, is able to have an immediate relation to God.17
More careful study should be done on this theme, but it seems to me 
that Origen’s notion of spiritual sense is a historical root of some modern 
ideas of religion as a natural property of a human being. Even though 
the theory of homo religiosus holds that religion is something natural 
for people whereas Origen thought that it was something supernatural, 
the common idea is that there is some kind of specific religious ability of 
mind in the human constitution that makes religious attitudes possible. 
From such a point of view, it is not only the cognitive content of religious 
emotions that specifies them as religious. Moreover, there has to be 
some specific property of consciousness that is able to direct the mind 
16 For Origen’s and Clemens’ views, see Petri Järveläinen, A  Study on Religious 
Emotions, pp. 72-84.
17 Origen, De Princ I. 1.9 (ANF 4, p. 245)
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toward religious objects in a correct way. For Ancient theologians such 
as Origen, both the cognitive part of a spiritual emotion and the affective 
part of it are supernatural. Spiritual people have, so to say, a new kind 
of supplementary part or vehicle in their brains. According to this view, 
the Holy Spirit influences both the new kind of cognitive content and 
also the ability of the mind to apprehend them. One version of this line 
of thinking is Martin Luther’s notion of faith as fiducia. Fiducia is a gift 
of the Holy Spirit. In his early explanation of Paul’s letter to Galatians, 
Luther says that fiducia is affectus certus, a certain feeling or emotion, 
of the religious truth that Christ is the Redemptor of a person feeling 
such faith. If asked the justification of religious emotions within such 
a tradition, it is the emotion of faith that justifies feeling religiously.18
I  find this to be a  rather circular view elucidating in the context 
of the philosophy of religion. In contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy of religion, the rational justification of religious belief and 
epistemological questions have been quite dominating issues. If the 
justification of religious matters lies in the emotions, it is hard to find 
them to be particularly strong arguments within the discussion of 
rational argumentation. If emotions are taken seriously, it is not easy 
to regard religion itself as an argumentative form of life. If God can be 
apprehended by emotions and furthermore religious convictions and 
interiorisations are tied to emotions, rational argumentation for or 
against religion appears to be problematic. Rational argumentation is 
problematic since its notion of religion is problematic. Perhaps religion 
is not a particularly argumentative form of life at all.
Adopting the view of religion as a  non-argumentative form of life 
leads to the view called fideism. There are different types of fideism. 
In my mind, religious attitudes are based on emotions. In order to 
make use of the idea put forward by Eva-Maria Dûhringer and Ruth 
Tietjen, I  think that religious attitudes are emotion-based judgments 
which give rise to judgment-based emotions.19 For this reason the term 
judgment in religious content is associated with a different significance 
than that of rational judgment. If a  person feels that there is a  God, 
he or she is experientially committed to the judgment-like utterance 
18 Martin Luther, WA II, in Epistolam Pauli ad Galatas Commentarius 1519 (D Martin 
Luther’s Werke 2) (Weimar: Herman Böhlau, 1884), p. 458.
19 Eva-Maria Dühringer & Ruth Tietjken, Presentation in the seminary Religiöse 
Gefühle in Tübingen, 2013.
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‘there is a God’, but it is based on an emotion and not on the genuine 
rational justification of judgment. Religious attitudes are emotional 
judgments. They are not based on rational calculation or evidence given 
by methodologically justified research but on emotion. Religious people 
are feeling that religious matters are true or at least significant for them. 
Usually religious attitudes are not born in such a manner that a person 
first calculates in his or her mind whether religious sentences are true 
or not. Rather, religious attitudes are born experientially. To hold such 
a fideistic view does not necessarily involve a view according to which 
religious attitudes are totally autonomous attitudes. To put the idea in 
Wittgensteinian terms, a religious language game is its own and it does 
not make shifts in the game of rational argumentation. It, however, has 
some relation to it. If the game of rational argumentation proves that 
there is no possible world in which religious emotions make sense, such 
a proof could be very problematic from the point of view of religious 
faith. Religious faith in its mainstream forms supposes that religious 
sentences refer to something real.
III. SPIRITUAL EMOTIONS AS TONES OF LOGOS
One problem associated with spiritual emotions in ancient theology is 
that, according to advocators of this view, spiritual emotions are only 
analogous to natural, general emotions. Moreover, they cannot be 
uttered in natural language. The question arises, are they a kind of private 
language in the Wittgensteinian sense? To be sure, Origen and others did 
not think so. For them spiritual emotions belong to the new language 
used by Logos and they can be felt by virtue of new senses.
In order to make use of that kind of idea, I am now willing to sketch 
out rather personal and speculative idea on religious emotions.
Let us take seriously the idea that there are religious or spiritual 
emotions that are not expressible in language. Furthermore, let us take 
seriously the idea that there are religious emotions which are different 
from every other kind of emotion. Language here means linguistic and 
propositional language such as German, English, and Finnish, and the 
common rules of them.
Ancient theologians pointed out that there are also other kind of 
languages besides linguistic languages. In modern thinking from William 
of Ockham to Jerry Fodor, some authors have suggested that besides 
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linguistic languages there is something called the mental language.20 
Moreover, it is commonly argued that there is universal language called 
music. All people have mental language and all people understand the 
language of music but they cannot translate their content to linguistic 
languages.
In explaining Aristotle’s notion of spoken language as a  symbol 
of mental effects, Boethius pointed out that there are three types of 
languages: written, spoken, and mental languages. The idea put forward 
by Boethius was adopted by medieval discussion. On the basis of it, 
William of Ockham employed the theory of language of thought. For 
Ockham, the language of thought was not to express silently in mind 
utterances of spoken language. It was the presupposition of natural 
language rather. According to Ockham’s view, there are pronomines, 
predicates and objects in the language of thought. But it consists of 
moods and mental states also.21 It seems to me that he meant something 
like this. If one says ‘Beethoven wrote a letter’, the meaning is different 
than if someone says the same proposition like this: ‘Beethoven wrote 
a letter?’ The change of meaning here is explained by virtue of properties 
in the language of thought.
In medieval discussion it was supposed that angels are using the 
language of thought when they are sending messages to each other. The 
special issue concerned the question of how to express the syntax of the 
language of thought. Far later, Gottlob Frege tried to write the syntax of 
such a  language by logical symbols. The most well-known advocate of 
the theory of the mental language in contemporary philosophy is Jerry 
Fodor. He supposes that learning natural languages is based on the fact 
that we have language already, before learning one’s mother language. 
Language skills are based on an internal code that consists of symbols 
and mental processes within symbols. Fodor does not seem to believe 
that such a code can be opened.22
I find Ockham’s notion that moods are included in mental language 
interesting. Moods are usually regarded as properties of experiences 
associated with music. Could one think that music is part of mental 
language? Moreover, music is of interest in this respect because it 
20 For mental language, see E. J. Ashworth, ‘Mental language and the unity of 
propositions: a  semantic problem discussed by early Sixteenth Century logicians’, 
Franciscan Studies, 41 (1981), 61-96.
21 William of Ockham, Quodlibet, V, pp. 8-10.
22 Jerry Fodor, The Language of Thought (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1975).
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is possible to open its code as notation. As a  matter of fact, Boethius 
claimed that analogously with language, there is played, listened and 
inner, mental music. Music is organised voice. It is formed by kinds of 
propositions, so called phares. It is interesting here that even though 
musical propositions seem to say something, they can be expressed only 
by playing or singing. They can be written by musical notation, and every 
composer knows how to write for instance melancholic or joyful music.
In the history of philosophy, the great debate has been concerned 
with the relation of music and emotions.23 Usually all suppose that music 
has something to do with emotions. The mode system in ancient times 
was meant to express emotions. The affect theory that was adopted for 
instance by Johan Sebastian Bach had a  similar target. According to 
the affect theory of music, music influences bodily senses which are 
registered by the soul. Many philosophers have, however, insisted that 
music does not cause emotions. Such a view was adopted by the Stoics 
who thought that musical effects are associated with bodily sensations 
and do not form any of the judgments crucial for emotions. It seems that 
such a view was adopted also by Immanuel Kant. In modern discussion, 
some have argued that music does not cause emotions since it does not 
involve cognitive propositions as intentional objects for emotions. I find 
such a view wrong. I think that musical structure or the syntax of music 
correlates with propositions and affects a listener.
Ludwig van Beethoven was one of those first to argue that music does 
not belong to the lower sensational area of the human constitution but it 
is even more exact tool to apprehend reality than sciences. That kind of 
view was employed by Schopenhauer too. In contemporary discussion, 
Peter Kivy had advocated a philosophical theory of music according to 
which it reveals something new of reality. For Kivy, music is an intellectual 
phenomenon including emotions. In his An Introduction to a Philosophy 
of Music, Kivy points out that the emotionality of music reminds us 
of when one claims that yellow is a  joyful colour. When claiming so, 
yellowness is supposed to involve joy as one of its qualities. Emotions 
in music are raised, however, as emergent phenomena of music from 
its complex forms. They may have some evolutionary basis. Because 
music seems to involve a lot of emotions which do not have any correlate 
among other emotions, it cannot be reduced to some evolutionary forms, 
23 I  am following here Peter Kivy, Introduction to a  Philosophy of Music (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002).
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however. Emotions and moods in music are learnt by just listening to 
music. Perhaps major and minor are reflecting general joy and sadness 
but what is the reference of A major or d minor? For Kivy, they have 
their peculiar or own mood or emotion. In order to understand it, one 
must listen to A major or d minor. For this reason, music, for Kivy, is 
a black box. There is no outer explanatory tool to understand it.24 People 
who cannot feel musical emotions cannot understand what they are 
just as, according to ancient theologians, people who don’t feel spiritual 
emotions cannot understand what they are.
One path of thinking is to say that the emotion of A major is just in 
brains and at the same time it is something that is in the physical reality of 
voices. For instance, Boethius thought that inner music is cosmic music 
at the same time: what is in mind is something that is in the structure of 
the world.
Let us return to the philosophy of religion. Augustine says in 
his De Trinitate that the heart is speaking words in no-language.25 
Correspondingly, Origen tells us in his commentary for Songs of the 
Songs that the soul has to sing first all six songs full of light and joy 
in order to reach the Song of the Songs.26 These remarks remind us of 
the mystery of music. If cosmic music really is both in mind and in the 
structure of the world as Boethius argued, in Christian religious context 
it belongs to logos. Logos is namely the structure of the world by which 
God has created the world. If so, Logos is not speaking just German, 
English and Finnish. Logos is not only the linguistic structure of the 
world but something more. From this point of view Logos is also image 
and tone. And if so, religious emotions are tied to the tones of Logos.
24 Peter Kivy, Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, pp. 32-45.
25 Augustine, De Trin. XV, 10-11.
26 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), pp. 55-58.
